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IETF RFC 9364
Last modified on Wednesday, February 15th, 2023
 Permanent link to RFC 9364
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Hoffman
Request for Comments: 9364 ICANN
BCP: 237 February 2023
Category: Best Current Practice
ISSN: 2070-1721
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
 Abstract
This document describes the DNS Security Extensions (commonly called
"DNSSEC") that are specified in RFCs 4033, 4034, and 4035, as well as
a handful of others. One purpose is to introduce all of the RFCs in
one place so that the reader can understand the many aspects of
DNSSEC. This document does not update any of those RFCs. A second
purpose is to state that using DNSSEC for origin authentication of
DNS data is the best current practice. A third purpose is to provide
a single reference for other documents that want to refer to DNSSEC.
Status of This Memo
This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 9364.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice
1.2. Implementing DNSSEC
2. DNSSEC Core Documents
2.1. Addition to the DNSSEC Core
3. Additional Cryptographic Algorithms and DNSSEC
4. Extensions to DNSSEC
5. Additional Documents of Interest
6. IANA Considerations
7. Security Considerations
8. References
8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Author's Address
1. Introduction
The core specification for what we know as DNSSEC (the combination of
[RFC 4033], [RFC 4034], and [RFC 4035]) describes a set of protocols
that provide origin authentication of DNS data. [RFC 6840] updates
and extends those core RFCs but does not fundamentally change the way
that DNSSEC works.
This document lists RFCs that should be considered by someone
creating an implementation of, or someone deploying, DNSSEC as it is
currently standardized. Although an effort was made to be thorough,
the reader should not assume this list is comprehensive. It uses
terminology from those documents without defining that terminology.
It also points to the relevant IANA registry groups that relate to
DNSSEC. It does not, however, point to standards that rely on zones
needing to be signed by DNSSEC, such as DNS-Based Authentication of
Named Entities (DANE) [RFC 6698].
1.1. DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice
Using the DNSSEC set of protocols is the best current practice for
adding origin authentication of DNS data. To date, no Standards
Track RFCs offer any other method for such origin authentication of
data in the DNS.
More than 15 years after the DNSSEC specification was published, it
is still not widely deployed. Recent estimates are that fewer than
10% of the domain names used for websites are signed, and only around
a third of queries to recursive resolvers are validated. However,
this low level of deployment does not affect whether using DNSSEC is
a best current practice; it just indicates that the value of
deploying DNSSEC is often considered lower than the cost.
Nonetheless, the significant deployment of DNSSEC beneath some top-
level domains (TLDs) and the near-universal deployment of DNSSEC for
the TLDs in the DNS root zone demonstrate that DNSSEC is applicable
for implementation by both ordinary and highly sophisticated domain
owners.
1.2. Implementing DNSSEC
Developers of validating resolvers and authoritative servers, as well
as operators of validating resolvers and authoritative servers, need
to know the parts of the DNSSEC protocol that would affect them.
They should read the DNSSEC core documents and probably at least be
familiar with the extensions. Developers will probably need to be
very familiar with the algorithm documents as well.
As a side note, some of the DNSSEC-related RFCs have significant
errata, so reading the RFCs should also include looking for the
related errata.
2. DNSSEC Core Documents
What we refer to as "DNSSEC" is the third iteration of the DNSSEC
specification; [RFC 2065] was the first, and [RFC 2535] was the second.
Earlier iterations have not been deployed on a significant scale.
Throughout this document, "DNSSEC" means the protocol initially
defined in [RFC 4033], [RFC 4034], and [RFC 4035].
The three initial core documents generally cover different topics:
* [RFC 4033] is an overview of DNSSEC, including how it might change
the resolution of DNS queries.
* [RFC 4034] specifies the DNS resource records used in DNSSEC. It
obsoletes many RFCs about earlier versions of DNSSEC.
* [RFC 4035] covers the modifications to the DNS protocol incurred by
DNSSEC. These include signing zones, serving signed zones,
resolving in light of DNSSEC, and authenticating DNSSEC-signed
data.
At the time this set of core documents was published, someone could
create a DNSSEC implementation of signing software, of a DNSSEC-aware
authoritative server, and/or of a DNSSEC-aware recursive resolver
from the three core documents, plus a few older RFCs specifying the
cryptography used. Those two older documents are the following:
* [RFC 2536] defines how to use the DSA signature algorithm (although
it refers to other documents for the details). DSA was thinly
implemented and can safely be ignored by DNSSEC implementations.
* [RFC 3110] defines how to use the RSA signature algorithm (although
refers to other documents for the details). RSA is still among
the most popular signing algorithms for DNSSEC.
It is important to note that later RFCs update the core documents.
As just one example, [RFC 9077] changes how TTL values are calculated
in DNSSEC processing.
2.1. Addition to the DNSSEC Core
As with any major protocol, developers and operators discovered
issues with the original core documents over the years. [RFC 6840] is
an omnibus update to the original core documents and thus itself has
become a core document. In addition to covering new requirements
from new DNSSEC RFCs, it describes many important security and
interoperability issues that arose during the deployment of the
initial specifications, particularly after the DNS root was signed in
2010. It also lists some errors in the examples of the core
specifications.
[RFC 6840] brings a few additions into the core of DNSSEC. It makes
NSEC3 [RFC 5155] as much a part of DNSSEC as NSEC is. It also makes
the SHA-256 and SHA-512 hash functions defined in [RFC 4509] and
[RFC 5702] part of the core.
3. Additional Cryptographic Algorithms and DNSSEC
Current cryptographic algorithms typically weaken over time as
computing power improves and new cryptoanalysis emerges. Two new
signing algorithms have been adopted by the DNSSEC community:
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [RFC 6605] and
Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC 8080]. ECDSA
and EdDSA have become very popular signing algorithms in recent
years. The GOST signing algorithm [GOST-SIGN] was also adopted but
has seen very limited use, likely because it is a national algorithm
specific to a very small number of countries.
Implementation developers who want to know which algorithms to
implement in DNSSEC software should refer to [RFC 8624]. Note that
this specification is only about what algorithms should and should
not be included in implementations, i.e., it is not advice about
which algorithms zone operators should or should not use for signing,
nor which algorithms recursive resolver operators should or should
not use for validation.
4. Extensions to DNSSEC
The DNSSEC community has extended the DNSSEC core and the
cryptographic algorithms, both in terms of describing good
operational practices and in new protocols. Some of the RFCs that
describe these extensions include the following:
* [RFC 5011] describes a method to help resolvers update their DNSSEC
trust anchors in an automated fashion. This method was used in
2018 to update the DNS root trust anchor.
* [RFC 6781] is a compendium of operational practices that may not be
obvious from reading just the core specifications.
* [RFC 7344] describes using the CDS and CDNSKEY resource records to
help automate the maintenance of DS records in the parents of
signed zones.
* [RFC 8078] extends [RFC 7344] by showing how to do initial setup of
trusted relationships between signed parent and child zones.
* [RFC 8198] describes how a validating resolver can emit fewer
queries in signed zones that use NSEC and NSEC3 for negative
caching.
* [RFC 9077] updates [RFC 8198] with respect to the TTL fields in
signed records.
5. Additional Documents of Interest
The documents listed above constitute the core of DNSSEC, the
additional cryptographic algorithms, and the major extensions to
DNSSEC. This section lists some additional documents that someone
interested in implementing or operating DNSSEC might find of value:
* [RFC 4470] "describes how to construct DNSSEC NSEC resource records
that cover a smaller range of names than called for by [RFC 4034].
By generating and signing these records on demand, authoritative
name servers can effectively stop the disclosure of zone contents
otherwise made possible by walking the chain of NSEC records in a
signed zone".
* [RFC 6975] "specifies a way for validating end-system resolvers to
signal to a server which digital signature and hash algorithms
they support".
* [RFC 7129] "provides additional background commentary and some
context for the NSEC and NSEC3 mechanisms used by DNSSEC to
provide authenticated denial-of-existence responses". This
background is particularly important for understanding NSEC and
NSEC3 usage.
* [RFC 7583] "describes the issues surrounding the timing of events
in the rolling of a key in a DNSSEC-secured zone".
* [RFC 7646] "defines Negative Trust Anchors (NTAs), which can be
used to mitigate DNSSEC validation failures by disabling DNSSEC
validation at specified domains".
* [RFC 7958] "describes the format and publication mechanisms IANA
has used to distribute the DNSSEC trust anchors".
* [RFC 8027] "describes problems that a Validating DNS resolver,
stub-resolver, or application might run into within a non-
compliant infrastructure".
* [RFC 8145] "specifies two different ways for validating resolvers
to signal to a server which keys are referenced in their chain of
trust".
* [RFC 8499] contains lists of terminology used when talking about
DNS; Sections 10 and 11 cover DNSSEC.
* [RFC 8509] "specifies a mechanism that will allow an end user and
third parties to determine the trusted key state for the root key
of the resolvers that handle that user's DNS queries".
* [RFC 8901] "presents deployment models that accommodate this
scenario [when each DNS provider independently signs zone data
with their own keys] and describes these key-management
requirements".
* [RFC 9276] "provides guidance on setting NSEC3 parameters based on
recent operational deployment experience".
There will certainly be other RFCs related to DNSSEC that are
published after this one.
6. IANA Considerations
IANA already has three registry groups that relate to DNSSEC:
* DNSSEC algorithm numbers (https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-
sec-alg-numbers)
* DNSSEC NSEC3 parameters (https://www.iana.org/assignments/dnssec-
nsec3-parameters)
* DNSSEC DS RRtype digest algorithms
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types)
The rules for the DNSSEC algorithm registry were set in the core RFCs
and updated by [RFC 6014], [RFC 6725], and [RFC 9157].
This document does not update or create any registry groups or
registries.
7. Security Considerations
All of the security considerations from all of the RFCs referenced in
this document apply here.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC 3110] Eastlake 3rd, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the
Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3110,
May 2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3110>.
[RFC 4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4033, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4033>.
[RFC 4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4034, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4034>.
[RFC 4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4035>.
[RFC 4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
(DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4509, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4509>.
[RFC 5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5155, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5155>.
[RFC 5702] Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY
and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5702, October 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5702>.
[RFC 6840] Weiler, S., Ed. and D. Blacka, Ed., "Clarifications and
Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)", RFC 6840,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 6840, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6840>.
8.2. Informative References
[GOST-SIGN]
Belyavsky, D., Dolmatov, V., Ed., and B. Makarenko, Ed.,
"Use of GOST 2012 Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG
Resource Records for DNSSEC", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-dnsop-RFC 5933-bis-13, 30 November 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-
RFC 5933-bis-13>.
[RFC 2065] Eastlake 3rd, D. and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System
Security Extensions", RFC 2065, DOI 10.17487/RFC 2065,
January 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 2065>.
[RFC 2535] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System Security
Extensions", RFC 2535, DOI 10.17487/RFC 2535, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 2535>.
[RFC 2536] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 2536, DOI 10.17487/RFC 2536, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 2536>.
[RFC 4470] Weiler, S. and J. Ihren, "Minimally Covering NSEC Records
and DNSSEC On-line Signing", RFC 4470,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4470, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4470>.
[RFC 5011] StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
Trust Anchors", STD 74, RFC 5011, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5011,
September 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5011>.
[RFC 6014] Hoffman, P., "Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier
Allocation for DNSSEC", RFC 6014, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6014,
November 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6014>.
[RFC 6605] Hoffman, P. and W.C.A. Wijngaards, "Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 6605,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 6605, April 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6605>.
[RFC 6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6698, August
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6698>.
[RFC 6725] Rose, S., "DNS Security (DNSSEC) DNSKEY Algorithm IANA
Registry Updates", RFC 6725, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6725, August
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6725>.
[RFC 6781] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 6781, December 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6781>.
[RFC 6975] Crocker, S. and S. Rose, "Signaling Cryptographic
Algorithm Understanding in DNS Security Extensions
(DNSSEC)", RFC 6975, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6975, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6975>.
[RFC 7129] Gieben, R. and W. Mekking, "Authenticated Denial of
Existence in the DNS", RFC 7129, DOI 10.17487/RFC 7129,
February 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7129>.
[RFC 7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 7344, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7344>.
[RFC 7583] Morris, S., Ihren, J., Dickinson, J., and W. Mekking,
"DNSSEC Key Rollover Timing Considerations", RFC 7583,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 7583, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7583>.
[RFC 7646] Ebersman, P., Kumari, W., Griffiths, C., Livingood, J.,
and R. Weber, "Definition and Use of DNSSEC Negative Trust
Anchors", RFC 7646, DOI 10.17487/RFC 7646, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7646>.
[RFC 7958] Abley, J., Schlyter, J., Bailey, G., and P. Hoffman,
"DNSSEC Trust Anchor Publication for the Root Zone",
RFC 7958, DOI 10.17487/RFC 7958, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7958>.
[RFC 8027] Hardaker, W., Gudmundsson, O., and S. Krishnaswamy,
"DNSSEC Roadblock Avoidance", BCP 207, RFC 8027,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 8027, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8027>.
[RFC 8078] Gudmundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS Records from
the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", RFC 8078,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 8078, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8078>.
[RFC 8080] Sury, O. and R. Edmonds, "Edwards-Curve Digital Security
Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 8080,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 8080, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8080>.
[RFC 8145] Wessels, D., Kumari, W., and P. Hoffman, "Signaling Trust
Anchor Knowledge in DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)",
RFC 8145, DOI 10.17487/RFC 8145, April 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8145>.
[RFC 8198] Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of
DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC 8198,
July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8198>.
[RFC 8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC 8499,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8499>.
[RFC 8509] Huston, G., Damas, J., and W. Kumari, "A Root Key Trust
Anchor Sentinel for DNSSEC", RFC 8509,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 8509, December 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8509>.
[RFC 8624] Wouters, P. and O. Sury, "Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for DNSSEC", RFC 8624,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 8624, June 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8624>.
[RFC 8901] Huque, S., Aras, P., Dickinson, J., Vcelak, J., and D.
Blacka, "Multi-Signer DNSSEC Models", RFC 8901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 8901, September 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8901>.
[RFC 9077] van Dijk, P., "NSEC and NSEC3: TTLs and Aggressive Use",
RFC 9077, DOI 10.17487/RFC 9077, July 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 9077>.
[RFC 9157] Hoffman, P., "Revised IANA Considerations for DNSSEC",
RFC 9157, DOI 10.17487/RFC 9157, December 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 9157>.
[RFC 9276] Hardaker, W. and V. Dukhovni, "Guidance for NSEC3
Parameter Settings", BCP 236, RFC 9276,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 9276, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 9276>.
Acknowledgements
The DNS world owes a depth of gratitude to the authors and other
contributors to the core DNSSEC documents and to the notable DNSSEC
extensions.
In addition, the following people made significant contributions to
early draft versions of this document: Ben Schwartz and Duane
Wessels.
Author's Address
Paul Hoffman
ICANN
Email: paul.hoffman@icann.org
RFC TOTAL SIZE: 22778 bytes
PUBLICATION DATE: Wednesday, February 15th, 2023
LEGAL RIGHTS: The IETF Trust (see BCP 78)
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